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 ÅRSTEIN SVIHUS
The Challenge of Trawling in Norwegian Fisheries
and Politics in the First Half of the 20th Century
The development of steamboat trawling from the 1890s onwards represented a clear step
towards further industrialisation of the fisheries of northern Europe. The main aim of this ar-
ticle is to explain why large-scale trawling developed late in Norway, and also to focus on the
restrictive laws that were passed against trawling.
From its early beginnings with small steam trawlers carrying out trawling close to the shore,
this sort of fishing technology soon spread to other countries, steam trawlers rapidly taking a
larger part of the total catch. Even before the First World War, British, German and French
trawlers could be found fishing between the North Sea and the White Sea in Russia. After the
war there was further growth, and trawling became a major part of the fishing industry in sev-
eral countries.
Trawling is also a major factor explaining the large increase in total catches of fish in the
North Atlantic.1 From 1910 to 1934 the catches of bottom fish (most of it cod) increased from
1,127,000 tons to 1,854,000 tons, a growth of 65 per cent. It were the catches from the Barents
Sea and the seas around Iceland that increased the most, with a growth of 144 and 176 per cent
respectively. On these fishing grounds more than 69 per cent of the catches were taken by
trawlers.2
In other countries, the development of a trawling fleet was responsible for a huge increase in
catches. For instance, Germany’s total catch increased by almost 350 per cent between 1913 and
1937.3 Countries like France and the Netherlands to some extent experienced a similar develop-
ment. The French trawler fleet even had some of the largest and most modern trawlers of its
time. In the Thirties the largest was of 1200 tons with a diesel engine and a crew of more than
50 men. The production on board was basically of salted fish (cod), but there were also small-
scale plants producing cod liver oil and fishmeal. Some of the trawlers were even equipped with
freezers.4 In general, then, trawling underwent an extensive modernisation during the interwar
period: the boats were bigger, newly developed gear made it possible to trawl on deeper grounds,
increasing fish production, and telecommunication was introduced into the trawlers in the Thir-
ties.
In the north-western parts of the Soviet Union, too, in Murmansk and Archangelsk, the fish
industry was partly based on large trawlers. In 1935 there were 77 active trawlers on the north-
eastern coast of the Soviet Union.5 Even so, during the whole of this period Great Britain had
the largest fleet, with about 1600 large steam trawlers in 1934.6 But many of these were older
vessels, and of the 823 trawlers based at Hull and Grimsby, only 344 were less than 15 years
old.7
All these fleets were fishing for home consumption, but in an export-oriented country like
Iceland, too, trawler fishing became a very important basis for fish exports. The Icelanders
bought their first trawlers shortly after the beginning of the century; in 1912 they had 20 traw-
lers, and by 1930 the figure was 40.8 In 1934 trawlers accounted for about 40 per cent of Ice-
land’s bottom fish catch.
        
The exception: Norway
As we have seen, trawling was generally expanding in northern Europe during the early decades
of the twentieth century, and thus was an important part of the expansion of fishing and fish-
related industry in the various countries of this region.
However, in Norway the situation was rather different and it was not until after World War
II that a relatively large trawler fleet was developed. Up to 1930 Norwegian-based trawling con-
sisted of small-scale trawling only (with boats under 50 tons). Most of the trawlers were solely
for shrimp fishing, a kind of fishery that for a few decades took on significant proportions. With
a few exceptions, such as Norwegians undertaking straw man fishing in the Moray Firth, the
small number of attempts to initiate large-scale trawling in Norway did not bring lasting busi-
ness success. The first shift came in the early Thirties, as new measures to run trawlers profita-
bly proved effective.
This happened at a time when, as we have seen, other countries had long since developed a
considerable fleet of trawlers. Why was the development different in Norway? This is a difficult
and far-reaching question, but some possible answers may be outlined. One possible reason is
the condition of the Norwegian seabed, which only has a narrow shelf close to the shore, and
then steepens. Also, a bumpy ground made trawling in Norwegian waters more challenging
than in the western parts of the North Sea.
Another explanation might be found in the industrial situation. The Norwegian fish industry
at the time was mainly established in western Norway, and was based not on bottom fish but
on pelagic species like herring, brisling and sardines. The structure of the large companies in this
industry was one of vertical integration, from modern fishing vessels to the production of label
stickers. Trawling, on the other hand, was not a part of their integrated structure. However, it is
interesting to note that before the First World War the largest factory in the Norwegian canning
industry, Chr. Bjelland & Co. A/S, partly based its production on fish balls made from haddock
and some cod provided by German trawlers. During the war this supply naturally ceased, and
the company did not start its own trawling until after World War II, and then only for herring.9
While the part of the fishing fleet that was based on pelagic fish like herring received a high
degree of modernisation and investment at an early stage, the development of the cod-based
fishing fleet underwent modernisation of a different kind. New types of boats were introduced
early in the twentieth century, and small engines soon became more common than oars or sail.
But it remained a fleet consisting mostly of small vessels, and during the whole interwar period
most of its catches were taken close to the shore. This is also the reason why the Norwegian
share of the total catch in the north-east Atlantic was in steep decline between the wars. In 1913
Norway was responsible for 47 per cent of the total cod catch in the area, but in 1937 the figure
was only 27 per cent. In the same period the total cod catch increased from about 750,000 tons
to about one million tons.10
This also reflects the fact that for various reasons the Norwegian share of the cod market was
declining. Although the consumption of fish in general had expanded since the beginning of the
century, a large part of the growth was the result of different nations fishing for their home
market, producing fresh fish, salted fish, canned fish, etc. In contrast, the Norwegian exports of
cod were dominated by salted dry cod (clip fish) or dry cod (stockfish), products for which the
market became difficult for various reasons during the interwar period. In important markets
like Spain and Portugal the Norwegian exporters faced increasing competition from domestic
companies who caught large catches around Newfoundland and Greenland, as well as from Ice-
landic cod which gained an increasingly large part of the market. From 1913 to 1937 Iceland
increased its total catch by 361 per cent, while Norway’s showed a growth of only 142 per cent.
In addition, the international market itself became difficult because of protectionism, import
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quotas and so forth. The market for Norwegian dry and salted cod was also severely damaged
by the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the ensuing sanctions against Italy, and also by the
Spanish civil war and its impact on the market.
Trawling, a difficult issue for the Norwegian fisheries
This, then, was the situation at the time when the first Norwegian trawlers began to be operat-
ed at a profit. Why did trawling only became economically sustainable so late, and what were
the political repercussions of this?
In 1930 the steam trawler D/T BORGENES was bought for fishing out of the town of Kristian-
sund, in north-western Norway. The trawler was originally registered at 289 tons  and was built
in Hull in 1906, but had been owned by Swedes since 1925. Before it came to Kristiansund both
boat and gear had been modernised.
The trawler was mainly owned by fish exporting interests. In its first years the BORGENES was
trawling partly for bottom fish and partly for herring using purse seines. The fish was either
delivered fresh to the British market or salted.11 This divided use, between herring and other
fish, had been successful in small-scale trawling, but did not yield the same positive results with
a larger trawler like the BORGENES. Profitability was first achieved after production was shifted
to the salting of fish on board the vessel itself, delivering to the clip fish industry in Kristian-
sund, the main centre of that industry. As pointed out by Paal Christensen, this happened at a
period when the regional catches were showing a marked decline.12 As the coastal fishing fleet
could not keep up with the demands of the clip fish industry, the industry was spurred on to
take more control of this part of the production.
As it now seemed possible to make money from trawling, other trawler companies were soon
established, and in 1936 Norway had a trawler fleet of eleven vessels, four located in Kristian-
sund and the rest in the towns of Bergen, Harstad, Bodø and Tromsø. With one exception, share
owners were representing fish traders and fish factories. This development is thus quite similar
to the organisation of contemporary British trawlers, although on a far smaller scale. These
vessels were, like the BORGENES, older but modernised trawlers.
In total, the Norwegian trawler catch in 1936 is estimated at around 8,000 tons of (uncut) fish,
representing 1 per cent of the total catch and 3.6 per cent of the cod catch. The trawlers’ share
of catches in distant waters was much greater, almost 30 per cent.13 Trawlered cod also made a
large contribution to the manufacturing of salted cod and clip fish, with a share of 12.5 per cent.
Although cod represented the most important part of the catch, both in quantity and in value,
trawlers did of course take various other kinds of fish. In 1936, representatives from the
canning industry claimed that the new factory in Harstad, built in 1934 and mainly devoted to
the production of fish balls, received almost 70 per cent of its fish supplies from trawlers.14 
The Norwegian debate on trawling
After Norwegian-based trawling was introduced, the issue of trawling soon became the subject
of heated debate in some of the fishing communities, and before long it was also a political issue.
The result was the temporary Trawler Act of 1936 that limited the trawler fleet to those vessels
already in service and restricted it to the provision of salt fish only. In 1939 an even more
restrictive law was passed.
Although large-scale trawling began late, the Trawler Act of 1936 was actually the third law
on this issue in Norway. As early as 1908 a general ban was placed on trawling in Norwegian
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waters. However, this law was merely designed to prevent foreign trawling taking place through
the use of Norwegian straw men after foreign fishing had been banned two years earlier. A new
law on trawling that was introduced in 1925 also regulated shrimp trawling.
Despite these laws, foreign trawling was considered a growing problem even before the First
World War, both on the fishing banks and in some fjords and other fishing grounds close to the
shore. Norwegian jurisdiction over territorial waters was strongly challenged by Britain and
others, and Norwegian fishermen along parts of the coast often reported that they found their
gear destroyed by foreign trawlers, both outside and inside the territorial limits.
The question of territorial limits at sea became an enduring dispute between Norway and
Britain, which was not resolved until a legal settlement at The Hague in 1951 decided the
matter in Norway’s favour. These jurisdictional disputes, combined with the conflicts on the
fishing grounds, gave trawling in general a bad reputation. In ongoing debates the foreign trawl-
ers were often referred to as the “scourge of trawling” (trawlerplagen).
Naturally the conflict over fishing limits at sea was also hotly debated by the Norwegian
public, but to some extent a clarification of the matter was reached in 1935 when the Norwe-
gian government formally defined the fishery limits in most of northern Norway in accordance
with what was claimed to be established Norwegian custom and with coastal interests. However,
at that point the question of Norwegian trawling was raised.
As foreign trawling was considered to be chiefly a problem for the fisheries in northern Nor-
way, it was in this region that the debate about Norwegian trawling seemed to become most
acute. This happened soon after the first trawler, named MARIE JAQUELINE, was bought for use in
northern Norway by an investment company in the town of Tromsø in September 1935.
While foreign trawling was seen primarily as a threat to passive gear and to the resources on
the fishing grounds, Norwegian trawling also represented an immediate challenge to the local
market and – for the longer term – posed the question of how the fisheries should be organised
in future.
The fish market was difficult in the Thirties. By the time of the development of a trawler fleet
in Norway, the market in general was characterised by low prices and a profitability problem in
many of the fisheries. The problems seem to have been greatest in cod-dependent districts in
northern Norway. Although the fisheries had been considerably modernised over the preceding
decades, the economic crisis in general had resulted in over-employment in the fisheries, or, as
a contemporary commentator put it, “the fishing fleet has turned into a rubbish bin”. Particu-
larly in the seasonal cod fisheries, especially in Lofoten, it was common to see both smaller and
larger modern motorised vessels alongside simple boats with oars or sail. Some of them were
manned by people with no fishing background, people without jobs or on low incomes who
engaged in cod fishing as a temporary employment and in the hope of better prospects. How-
ever, many of them had no success on the fishing grounds, and so the minister for trade (and
thus minister for fisheries) Alfred Madsen warned them and others not to seek work in the cod
fisheries, as it was a risky and often unprofitable business.15
Since the trawlers, Norwegian or foreign, were not permitted to fish beyond the territorial
limits, the immediate impact of trawling was on the market and not on the limited resources of
the fishing grounds. Outside Norwegian waters the problem posed by trawling was in some
areas a major one, regardless of the nationality of the trawlers. Although the main product of
the trawlers was salted cod for the clip fish industry, it was the landing of fresh fish that creat-
ed the greatest immediate problems from the point of view of the small-scale fishermen. Until
the late Thirties trawling was mostly carried out off Finnmark, and therefore conflicts between
trawlers and others developed first in that region. Only one month after the first northern Nor-
wegian trawler had been put into service, it was reported that with a single landing of fresh fish
it had knocked the bottom out of a local first-hand market in the region.16
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This was in 1935, and in that same year the local fishermen’s union (fiskarlag) of Vardø is-
sued a statement to the effect that “Norwegian trawling practically amounts to a war against
the tens of thousands of fishermen who are still tied to the old fishing methods.”17
But even though the problems of the first-hand market were first and foremost a problem in
the north, the trawler issue in general mobilised fishermen from all along the coast to question
how and in whose interest the future of the fisheries should be organised.18 Naturally the most
vigorous complaints against trawling came from fishermen in the north, especially those who
found their gear swept away by trawlers, but the ban of 1936 was strongly supported by all the
fishermen’s unions from north to south.19 At this time the issue of trawling transcended the
various conflicts between different groups of Norwegian fishermen.
The fishermen’s unions represented a complex group of fishermen who fully or partly owned
their own boats and gear, a deeply rooted tradition. It was therefore feared that the growing
development of a Norwegian trawler fleet was simply the beginning of a rapid change whereby
large parts of the fishing fleet, owned and operated by fishermen, would be replaced by invest-
ment companies and so-called “speculators”. The development of the industry in Great Britain
was often held up as an example to be avoided. A parliamentary committee that was set up to
discuss the problems of low profitability in the fisheries produced – probably unintentionally –
a somewhat frightening scenario. According to their calculations a trawler fleet of 200 trawlers
with a crew of 25 men each would be able to land Norway’s total catch of about 200,000 tons of
cut cod.20 At the time approximately 50,000 men were active in the cod fisheries.
But the question was not only about how many men were needed in the fishing fleet, but also
about how fishing should be run, and by whom. Disputes between active and passive ownership
had created considerable conflicts earlier, chiefly in northern Norway, as in 1890 when, in the
so-called Battle of the Trollfjord, the bitter rivalry over resources flared up into a fight between
small-scale fishermen and the crews of steam vessels in the narrow fjord of Trollfjorden in
Vesterålen.
The battle resulted in the 1891 law restricting fishing with seines, and in 1936 the continuing
conflict resulted in a temporary law prohibiting any further development. In 1939 a new law
confirmed these restrictions.
The Labour Party and the question of trawling
As the 1936 and 1939 laws were passed during the first and second terms in government of the
Norwegian Labour Party21, it is worth taking a closer look at that party.
According to its political platform the Labour Party was characterised by a strong policy of
modernisation in the fields of industry, technology and social organisation. Given this back-
ground, one would expect a positive attitude towards the technology represented by trawlers. A
Labour Party might also be expected to support the seamen on the trawlers rather than the
“small capitalists” on fishing boats. But this was rarely the case. Although the Labour Party was
divided on the question, the dividing line lay between those who wanted a total ban on trawling
and those who argued for a policy of merely restricting it. Hardly anyone connected with the
party openly supported increasing the role of trawlers in the fishing fleet. In fact it was the
Labour members of parliament who argued most aggressively against trawling.
The explanation for this lies partly in the fact that since 1903 the Labour Party had had an
extensive following in large parts of northern Norway. These supporters represented small-scale
fisheries, a sector that was facing major economic challenges in the Twenties and Thirties. These
circumstances led the Labour Party to focus mainly on the social challenges that the fisheries
were facing, and hence on the situation of the fishermen and their families. The party also
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stressed the role of “capitalist exploiters in the fisheries,”22 a group that could include those who
had invested in trawlers.
Although other political parties did not focus quite so strongly on this issue, the combination
of problems in the fish market and over-employment in the fisheries made it difficult to intro-
duce drastic remedies to effect a restructuring of the fishing fleet.
A liberalisation with considerable reservations
The Trawler Act of 1939 outlasted World War II; although it was challenged by the occupation
government, confrontation over the issue was avoided.23 The war itself had reduced the num-
bers of large trawlers in operation to only five.
The ending of the war had changed many of the premises on which the earlier laws on trawl-
ing had been based. The situation on the international fish market seemed positive, and unem-
ployment was no longer a problem.
The Labour Party won a majority in the first election after the war, its main goals being the
post-war rebuilding of the country and the speeding up of modernisation and industrialisation,
in the fisheries as in other sectors. Trawling had a natural part to play in these ambitions. Im-
porting countries like Spain and Portugal experienced a substantial increase in the size of their
trawling fleets, and, just as in the pre-war period, Iceland’s fleet was growing, having built up a
large freezing capacity during the war.24 In 1947 the government set up a committee to propose
measures to rationalise and modernise the fisheries. The majority of the committee, supported
by the leadership of the party, pointed out that an economically sustainable future for the fish-
eries required a rationalisation whereby trawlers and other larger vessels would form the
cornerstone of  the fishing fleet.
The Norwegian fisheries underwent a noticeable change during the first decades after the war,
in terms of both the fishing fleet and industrial growth on shore. Even so, the direction taken in
Norway was different from that taken in the other North Atlantic fisheries.
The Trawler Act of 1951, a problematic issue for the Labour Party
A new law on trawling was passed by the Labour government in 1951. This law opened the way
for further development of a trawling fleet, and did not, like the law of 1939, set explicit limits
on the numbers of trawlers. Nevertheless, the law was restrictive and a far cry from the ambi-
tious aims the party had set forth soon after the end of the war.
Moreover, the law was not passed without major resistance from the fishermen’s unions and
from the Labour Party’s own representatives in parliament. Neither the Labour Party nor the
unions at this point argued against trawling in principle, but the demand was voiced that only
trawlers under the control of the government or of the fishermen’s unions should be allowed.
Both of these demands were at odds with the Labour Party’s further move away from socialism
as indicated in its revised programme in 1949.
The resistance from parts of the Labour Party to the new Trawler Act of 1951 was so strong
that the government actually had to seek support from the conservative opposition in parlia-
ment. In addition, the Labour Party had to use strong measures to curb its internal conflicts on
the matter. The prime example of this was the treatment of one of the most influential agitators
against a liberal law on trawling, Jens Steffensen. He was the leader of the fishermen’s union
and represented the Labour Party in parliament; with the connivance of the Labour Party he was
manoeuvred out of his position, mainly because of his campaign against the new Trawler Act.25
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There followed a rapid increase in the number of large trawlers (of more than 200 tons), so
that in 1952 there were 29 large trawlers in operation. In addition, there were 115 trawlers be-
tween 20 and 200 tons. This increase continued. Even so, trawlers did not replace the smaller
fishing vessels, and the debate about the ownership and structure of the fishing fleet continued
to be a troublesome political issue in the following decades. The leadership of the Labour Party
did not succeed in gaining full control over the party on this issue and other issues related to
fisheries policy.
Although during these postwar decades neither the market nor the general economic situa-
tion in Norway posed major problems any more, the policies adopted during the crisis of the
interwar years seem to have consolidated a regionally based view on how the fisheries should
be structured. Even though the party had a majority in parliament until the election of 1961, it
could not afford to risk a confrontation with part of the party’s heartland. The further course of
events therefore shows continuous development and modernisation of the small-scale coastal
fleet, and the – albeit strictly regulated – development of a modern fleet of trawlers and larger
deep-sea vessels.
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Über die Herausforderung der Schleppnetzfischerei in der norwegischen Fischerei-
politik während der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Aufsatz wird die Frage diskutiert, warum sich die norwegische Schleppnetzfischerei-
flotte im Vergleich zu jenen anderer Fischereinationen im Nordatlantik relativ spät entwickel-
te. Im Mittelpunkt steht die Untersuchung, wie und auf welcher Grundlage die Schleppnetz-
fischerei zu einer politischen Fragestellung wurde. Der Aufsatz beleuchtet die Rolle der
Arbeiterpartei, die 1935-1963 an der Macht war und die von den Fischern bedeutsame Unter-
stützung erhielt.
Seit ihren Anfängen im späten 19. Jahrhundert in England war die Dampferschleppnetz-
fischereiflotte im Nordatlantik rasch angewachsen. Bald war es möglich, mit diesen Fischerei-
fahrzeugen beträchtliche Fänge zwischen der Nordsee und dem Weißen Meer in Russland zu
erzielen. Nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg wurde ein weiterer Zuwachs verzeichnet, allerdings ge-
wann die Schleppnetzfischerei während der zwanziger Jahre auch in anderen Ländern an Bedeu-
tung und wurde dort ebenfalls zum Hauptbestandteil der Fischindustrie. Die Entwicklung der
Schleppnetzfischereiflotte spielte eine wichtige Rolle, was sich beispielsweise im Gesamtfang
Deutschlands widerspiegelt, der zwischen 1913 und 1937 um mehr als 300 Prozent angestiegen
war. Andere Länder wie Frankreich und die Niederlande wiesen gewissermaßen eine ähnliche
Entwicklung auf. Jene Länder besaßen Flotten, die für den Inlandsverbrauch Fischerei betrieben,
doch auch für exportorientierte Länder wie Island wurde die Schleppnetzfischerei ein sehr
bedeutender Bestandteil der Fischindustrie.
In Norwegen war die Situation eine ganz andere. Obwohl die Gesamtfangmenge auch in Nor-
wegen zur gleichen Zeit anstieg, wurde nur ein geringer Teil des Fisches von Schleppnetzfang-
fahrzeugen angelandet. Ein erstes Gesetz über das Verbot der Schleppnetzfischerei in norwe-
gischen Gewässern war bereits 1908 erlassen worden. Neue Gesetze, die in den 1930er Jahren
erlassen wurden, ließen bis zur Nachkriegsperiode nur eine sehr eingeschränkte Schleppnetz-
fischerei in Norwegen zu.
Bis in die 30er Jahre des 20. Jahrhunderts stellte das Schleppnetzfischen hauptsächlich eine
politische Herausforderung für die bilateralen Beziehungen zwischen Norwegen und Großbri-
tannien aufgrund der strittigen Grenzen der norwegischen Hoheitsgewässer dar. Als norwe-
gische Interessengruppen in den 30er Jahren in Schleppnetzfangfahrzeuge investieren wollten,
wurde die Schleppnetzfischerei ebenfalls zu einer schwierigen inneren Angelegenheit. Diese
Debatte lieferte nicht nur einen neuerlichen Beleg für den dauerhaften Konflikt zwischen
mittelständischen und groß angelegten Fischereien, sondern sie war zudem ein begehrtes
Thema für die politischen Parteien.
In den 1930er Jahren beendeten restriktive Gesetze vorläufig die Weiterentwicklung der nor-
wegischen Schleppnetzfischereiflotte, indem diese auf elf Lizenzen beschränkt wurde und auch
den rechtsgültigen Lieferungen strenge Limitationen auferlegt wurden.
Nach dem Krieg verschob sich die Politik in Richtung der Schleppnetzfischerei, und eine
beachtliche Flotte von groß angelegten Schleppnetzfahrzeugen erwuchs aus dem neuen Ver-
mächtnis. Trotz der ehrgeizigen Bestrebungen einiger Schlüsselpersonen in politischen Füh-
rungspositionen wurde die Schleppnetzfischerei immer noch stark reguliert. Es ist der Bestän-
digkeit von Interessengruppen der Fischer und ihrer Wortführer zu verdanken, dass eine
Weiterentwicklung und Modernisierung einerseits der mittelständischen Küstenflotten und
andererseits der modernen Schleppnetzfischereiflotten und größeren Tiefseefangfahrzeuge
möglich war.
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Les enjeux du chalutage dans la politique de la pêche en Norvège au cours de la
première moitié du XXe siècle
Résumé
Cet article traite du développement de la flotte norvégienne des chalutiers, relativement tardif
en comparaison des autres nations pratiquant la pêche dans l’Atlantique nord. Au centre de
l’analyse se trouve la question de savoir comment et sur quelle base la pêche au chalut en arriva
au statut de question politique. L’article éclaire le rôle du Parti des travailleurs, qui était au pou-
voir en 1935-1963 et qui recevait un important soutien de la part des pêcheurs.
Depuis ses débuts, à la fin du XIXe siècle en Angleterre, la flotte de chalutiers à vapeur
s’agrandit rapidement dans l’Atlantique du Nord. Grâce à ces navires, il fut bientôt possible
d’augmenter considérablement les captures entre la mer du Nord et la mer Blanche en Russie.
Après la Première Guerre mondiale, un regain d’accroissement eut lieu, toutefois, au cours des
années vingt, la pêche au chalut prit de l’importance dans les autres pays également, y devenant
aussi le secteur le plus important de l’industrie poissonnière. Le développement de la flotte de
chalutiers jouait un rôle important, ce qui se reflète par exemple dans les captures totales en
Allemagne, qui augmentèrent de plus de 300 pour cent entre 1913 et 1937. D’autres pays
comme la France et les Pays-Bas, d’une certaine façon, font preuve d’une croissance semblable.
Ces pays possédaient des flottes qui pêchaient pour répondre à la consommation nationale, mais
pour des pays orientés vers l’exportation comme l’Islande, la pêche au chalut devint une part
importante de la pêche industrielle.
En Norvège, la situation était tout à fait différente. Bien qu’à la même époque, la capture tota-
le en Norvège ait également augmenté, seule une quantité moindre de poissons fut amenée par
des chalutiers. Une première loi sur l’interdiction de la pêche au chalut dans les eaux territoria-
les de la Norvège avait déjà été promulguée en 1908. De nouvelles lois, promulguées dans les
années trente, n’autorisèrent qu’une pêche au chalut très restreinte en Norvège et cela, jusque
dans les années d’après-guerre.
Jusque dans les années trente du XXe siècle, la pêche au chalut était principalement un enjeu
politique dans les relations bilatérales entre la Norvège et la Grande-Bretagne, en raison des
limites contestées des eaux territoriales norvégiennes. Lorsque des groupes d’intérêt norvégiens,
au cours des années trente, voulurent investir dans la pêche au chalut, celle-ci tendit également
à devenir une affaire intérieure complexe. Non seulement ces débats redonnaient cours au con-
flit latent entre la pêche pratiquée dans les moyennes entreprises et celle pratiquée à grande
échelle, mais elle devint un thème favori des partis politiques.
Durant les années trente, des lois restrictives empêchèrent provisoirement le développement
de la flotte des chalutiers norvégiens, réduisant le nombre des licences à 11 et soumettant les
livraisons valides à des réglementations sévères.
Après la guerre, la politique se déplaça vers la pêche au chalut et une flotte considérable de
chalutiers, très équipés, vit le jour de ce nouvel héritage. Malgré les efforts ambitieux de quel-
ques personnes-clé à des postes politiques chargés de responsabilités, la pêche au chalut conti-
nuait à être fortement réglementée. C’est grâce à la ténacité des groupes d’intérêt des pêcheurs
et de leurs porte-parole qu’un développement et une modernisation furent possibles, d’un côté
des flottes de cabotage moyennes, de l’autre des flottes de chalutiers modernes et de navires de
pêche en haute mer.
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